Steven Kerr examines how organisations and institutions frequently reward one kind of behaviour while expecting another. Individuals respond to the incentives they encounter, even when these conflict with official objectives. Examples include universities that reward research publications more than teaching, businesses that prioritise short-term profits over long-term development, and political systems that discourage candidates from discussing difficult policy choices. Kerr argues that apparently undesirable behaviour can be a rational response to existing rewards and penalties.

The article examines a manufacturing company whose managers criticised conformity and risk avoidance, although employees believed such conduct earned approval. An insurance firm sought accurate claims decisions but used performance measures that encouraged overpayment and prioritised attendance over effectiveness. Kerr identifies several causes of these contradictions, including excessive reliance on measurable results, attention to visible behaviour and differences between stated and actual priorities. He concludes that organisations should examine their existing incentives and align rewards with desired outcomes rather than relying primarily on recruitment or training to change behaviour.