Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around.
Friedman argues that established practices, particularly in government, are difficult to change under normal circumstances. A crisis can disrupt this stability, making previously unlikely decisions politically possible. His distinction between actual and perceived crises suggests that political responses depend not only on events themselves but also on how those events are understood and interpreted.
However, a crisis does not determine which changes will follow. Friedman maintains that the available ideas and proposals shape the decisions made when established arrangements come under pressure. This places importance on developing alternatives before they are urgently needed. Ideas that initially receive little political support may become influential when circumstances change.
The wider passage connects sudden political change with long-term intellectual preparation. Friedman sees a role for economists and other thinkers in keeping alternative policies available for future consideration. His argument explains how crises can create opportunities for reform without suggesting that every crisis produces change or that the resulting policies will necessarily be beneficial.
Full quotation
“There is enormous inertia—a tyranny of the status quo—in private and especially governmental arrangements. Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change.When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable.”